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Abstract
Background: Although Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are defined by the provision of primary care
services, the relationship between the intensity of primary care and population-level utilization and costs of health
care services has not been examined during early implementation of Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)
ACOs. Our objective was to evaluate the association between primary care focus and healthcare utilization and
spending in the first performance period of the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs).
Methods: In this retrospective cohort study, we divided the 220 MSSP ACOs into quartiles of primary care focus based
on the percentage of all ambulatory evaluation and management services delivered by a PCP (internist, family
physician, or geriatrician).
Using multivariable regression, we evaluated rates of utilization and spending during the initial performance period,
adjusting for the percentage of non-white patients, region, number of months enrolled in the MSSP, number of
beneficiary person years, percentage of dual eligible beneficiaries and percentage of beneficiaries over the age of 74.
Results: The proportion of ambulatory evaluation and management services delivered by a PCP ranged from <38%
(lowest quartile, ACOs with least PCP focus) to >46% (highest quartile, ACOs with greatest PCP focus). ACOs in the
highest quartile of PCP focus had higher adjusted rates of utilization of acute care hospital admissions (328 per 1000
person years vs 292 per 1000 person years, p = 0.01) and emergency department visits (756 vs 680 per 1000 person
years, p = 0.02) compared with ACOs in the lowest quartile of PCP focus. ACOs in the highest quartile of PCP focus
achieved no greater savings per beneficiary relative to their spending benchmarks ($142 above benchmark vs $87
below benchmark, p = 0.13).
Conclusions: Primary care focus was not associated with increased savings or lower utilization of healthcare during
the initial implementation of MSSP ACOs.
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Background
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) granted the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) the authority to
establish Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) [1]. The risk-
bearing payment systems accepted by MSSP ACOs are
designed to enhance accountability and care coordin-
ation among groups of providers. Accordingly, this pro-
gram has grown rapidly to include 405 ACOs caring for
approximately 7.2 million Medicare beneficiaries as of
January 2015 [2].
A primary requirement for participation in the MSSP
is that an ACO provides primary care services for at
least 5000 Medicare beneficiaries. Consequently, these
new organizations differ widely with respect to both
physician composition and the distribution of care pro-
vided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and specialist
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physicians. It is unknown, however, whether such differ-
ences influence ACO performance. Evaluation of the Pi-
oneer ACO program, a predecessor to the MSSP, noted
smaller increases in Medicare expenditures coupled with
decreased utilization of primary care visits, procedures,
imaging and testing compared to non-ACOs [3]. Special-
ists are often gatekeepers to high cost services including
procedures and imaging studies, and therefore may play
an important role in generating savings if they are en-
gaged in an ACO. ACOs also vary in their leadership
(physician versus hospital leads), location (rural versus
urban) and size, all of which can influence the physician
composition and patient populations served by the
ACO. While some believe that the optimal ACO model
involves provision of ambulatory care mainly by PCPs,
[4–6] the relationship between primary care focus and
utilization and costs of health care services has not been
examined during early implementation of MSSP ACOs.
To address this gap, we used data from CMS to meas-
ure the PCP focus of MSSP ACOs based on the percent-
age of evaluation and management services provided by
primary care physicians. We then compared utilization
of health care services and savings over benchmark dur-
ing the first performance period for MSSP ACOs accord-
ing to their level of PCP focus.
Methods
Data source
We used the CMS Shared Savings Program public-use
file [7] released in January 2015 to perform these ana-
lyses. This file provides ACO-level data from the first
performance period (ending December 2013) for the 220
MSSP ACOs that enrolled from April 2012 through
January 2013. Because we analyzed organizational data
from ACOs and not individual-level data, our study was
deemed not regulated by the University of Michigan In-
stitutional Review Board.
The available data include summary information on
ACO characteristics, as well as measures of benchmark
spending, and health services utilization and expenditures
during the performance period. In terms of benchmark
spending, the CMS Office of the Actuary calculates this
metric for each MSSP ACO based on the three years of
spending (under Medicare Fee-For-Service Parts A and B)
prior to the performance period for attributed beneficiar-
ies, with the most recent year weighted most heavily. The
benchmark estimates are risk adjusted using the CMS
Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCC), and the
national growth rate in Medicare spending is applied to
obtain the final benchmark spending [8]. Demographic
scores (recalculated annually for all ACO beneficiaries)
and CMS-HCC risk scores (calculated for new ACO
enrollees only) are combined to provide a case mix
adjustment that is updated annually based on the current
roster of assigned ACO beneficiaries.
Measurement and classification of PCP focus
Consistent with the statutory definition in the ACA, am-
bulatory evaluation and management services are de-
fined by Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System
codes 99201-99215, 99304-99350, G0402, G0438,
G0439, and by revenue center codes 0521, 0522, 0524,
0525 when submitted by a federally qualified health cen-
ter or rural health clinic. Medicare beneficiaries are
assigned to an ACO when the plurality of their primary
care services are provided by a physician who aligns with
an ACO via a tax identification number. Once the bene-
ficiary is assigned, all Medicare services and expendi-
tures related to their care are attributed to the ACO
whether this care occurs within the ACO or outside the
ACO. Currently, expenditures for MSSP ACOs are cal-
culated based on Medicare spending only and not Me-
dicaid or private insurer payments.
We based our measure of primary care focus on the
percentage of such services for ACO beneficiaries that
were delivered by any primary care physician, including
internists, family medicine physicians, geriatricians, and
pediatricians, during the first performance period. We
calculated this measure for each ACO by dividing the
number of evaluation and management visits provided
by a PCP per 1000 person years by the total number of
evaluation and management visits per 1000 person years.
Both of these variables were provided in the SSP files.
Using this measure, we sorted the MSSP ACOs into
quartiles of PCP focus based on their percentage of
evaluation and management services delivered by pri-
mary care physicians.
Outcome measures
From the SSP files, we also identified several measures
related to utilization of health care services, including
the number of acute care hospital discharges per 1000
person years, and the number of emergency department
visits per 1000 person years. Several summary measures
of ACO spending were also available, including bench-
mark (i.e., pre-ACO implementation) and performance
period expenditures.
For analytic purposes, we first annualized the expend-
iture metrics to account for variability in ACO start
dates. Next, we divided the annualized measures of
spending by the number of assigned beneficiary person
years (i.e., number of beneficiaries standardized for the
length of time they are attributed to the ACO) to calcu-
late the annual spending per beneficiary for each MSSP
ACO. Finally, we measured savings per beneficiary for
each ACO by subtracting the annualized per beneficiary
expenditures for the performance period from the
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annualized per beneficiary benchmark spending. For this
measure, positive and negative values indicate cost sav-
ings and losses, respectively.
Statistical analysis
We used Student’s t-test and ANOVA to compare char-
acteristics of ACOs with the least and greatest PCP
focus. We then used zip codes provided by CMS and
ArcGIS software version 10 (Esri, Redlands, California)
to map the location of ACOs falling in the highest and
lowest quartiles of PCP focus.
We fit multivariable linear models to estimate the ad-
justed association of PCP focus with ACO-level metrics of
utilization and spending, controlling for the percentage of
non-white patients, percentage of dual eligible beneficiar-
ies, percentage of beneficiaries over 74 years old, geo-
graphic region by census division (New England, Middle
Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Moun-
tain, Pacific), rurality, number of months enrolled in the
MSSP, and number of beneficiary person years. We se-
lected the covariates for our model a priori based on hy-
potheses and informed by prior work suggesting that
these factors may be associated with utilization and spend-
ing [9, 10]. For example, older age, non-white race and
dually eligible beneficiaries have been associated with
higher health care expenditures. From these models, we
estimated adjusted measures of utilization and spending
for each ACO and compared these across strata of PCP
focus. Utilization metrics included number of E&M visits,
acute care hospital discharges, readmissions (30 days),
post-hospitalization visits (30 days), emergency depart-
ment visits and discharges to a skilled nursing facility.
Spending metrics included physician spending, acute care
hospital spending, skilled nursing facility spending and an-
nual per beneficiary savings. Finally, we also evaluated
total expenditures.
We performed three additional sensitivity analyses.
First, to determine if our findings were robust to the use
of quartiles, we performed a linear regression to evaluate
utilization outcomes using the proportion of E&M ser-
vices provided by a PCP (continuous variable) as our
dependent variable. Second, we performed the same ana-
lyses listed above using terciles rather than quartiles. Fi-
nally, we used a log-log model to evaluate our spending
metrics with the proportion of E&M services provided
by a PCP as a continuous dependent variable. P values
<0.05 were considered statistically significant. All statis-
tical analyses were performed with Stata version 13 (Sta-
taCorp LP, College Station, Texas).
Results
We identified 220 ACOs that joined the MSSP from
April 2012 through January 2013. Overall, these 220
MSSP ACOs had total benchmark spending set at $42.5
billion and total expenditures of $42.3 billion for the
more than 3 million beneficiaries cared for during the
first performance period, resulting in more than $230
million in estimated savings.
We classified ACOs into four equal quartiles of PCP
focus defined by the following proportions of evaluation
and management services delivered by a PCP: 3.3–38.1%
(lowest quartile, referred to throughout the manuscript
as least PCP focus), 38.1–42.0% (quartile 2), 42.0–46.4%
(quartile 3), and 46.5–64.8% (highest quartile, referred to
as greatest PCP focus). As illustrated in Fig. 1, there
were significant differences in the geographic distribu-
tion of ACOs in the highest and lowest quartiles of PCP
focus during 2012 and 2013; ACOs with the greatest de-
gree of PCP focus were more common in the Midwest,
while those with the least PCP focus were more com-
mon in the Northeast (p = 0.02).
Table 1 compares characteristics of ACOs with the
greatest and least PCP focus and reveals a similar com-
position of beneficiaries (including overall number, as
well as those with end stage renal disease and those on
disability) with the exception that ACOs with the great-
est PCP focus have a higher proportion of non-white
and dual-eligible beneficiaries. Whereas the numbers of
PCPs per 1000 beneficiaries did not differ significantly
across quartiles (p = 0.57), the number of participating
specialists was almost twice as large in the two lowest
quartiles of PCP focus compared with the two highest
quartiles (p = 0.01) (Fig. 2).
Table 2 presents measures of utilization and expendi-
tures for ACOs in the highest compared with lowest
quartiles of PCP focus. ACOs with the greatest PCP
focus had more total E&M visits, including a compara-
tively higher number of PCP visits and a lower number
of specialist visits. During the first performance period,
MSSP ACOs with the greatest PCP focus had higher
Fig. 1 Geographic distribution of ACOs with the least and greatest
PCP focus (p = 0.02).* (*2 ACOs in Puerto Rico are not shown; both
were in the group with greatest PCP focus). Source: Created using
ArcGIS software. Permission granted for reproduction
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adjusted rates of acute care hospital admissions (328 per
1000 person years vs 292 per 1000 person years, p =
0.01) and emergency department visits (756 vs 680 per
1000 person years, p = 0.02) compared with ACOs with
the least PCP focus. No significant difference was evi-
dent in mean savings per beneficiary relative to bench-
mark spending levels across quartiles of PCP focus.
Additionally, we noted no differences in total expendi-
tures with $10,068 per beneficiary per year for low PCP
focus ACOs and $10,723 for ACOs with the greatest
PCP focus, p = 0.15.
Our sensitivity analyses revealed no substantive changes
from our primary findings. First, using the proportion of
E&M visits by a PCP as a continuous variable, our findings
of significantly higher rates of utilization remained for
skilled nursing facility and hospital admissions, as well as
readmissions and post discharge provider visits (all p-values
<0.05). When we divided ACOs into terciles of PCP focus
we demonstrated higher rates of utilization of post dis-
charge provider visits, skilled nursing facility discharges and
emergency department visits and no differences in savings
for ACOs in the highest tercile of PCP focus. Using a log-
log model to evaluate our spending outcomes, we similarly
demonstrated no difference in total expenditures, bench-
mark spending or total savings (all p > 0.05).
Discussion
MSSP ACOs differ significantly with respect to primary
care focus, as measured by the percentage of E&M ser-
vices provided by primary care physicians. Notably, in
the first performance period, ACOs with the greatest
PCP focus utilized more hospital care, suggesting that—-
during the earliest phases of ACO implementation—-
primary care intensity is not clearly associated with
lower utilization. Moreover, ACOs with the greatest
degree of PCP focus achieved no more savings than their
less PCP focused counterparts.
Our findings of increased utilization and no difference
in savings for ACOs with a greater degree of PCP focus
add to a growing body of literature examining factors
that may influence patterns of healthcare use and
savings in these organizations. While these results may
appear counter to prior work indicating that increasing
primary care focus may improve access, quality and cost;
[11] this relationship likely depends on both contextual
(e.g., ACO size) [5] and patient factors (e.g., comorbidi-
ties) [12] that vary across MSSP organizations. For
example, ACOs in more rural locations or those with a
smaller physician panel may have fewer specialist physi-
cians to manage complex medical conditions (e.g, CHF
managed by a cardiologist versus a PCP). ACOs in these
rural areas may face challenges with both specialty and
primary care physician shortages. Similarly, whether hos-
pital- or physician-led, ACO leadership will be incentiv-
ized differently and will need to adapt and respond to
their particular patient population and case-mix as im-
provements in population health are rewarded [13].
ACOs that have independent ownership have demon-
strated greater savings than hospital led organizations
early in the MSSP [14]. Additionally, location and prior
spending plays a role as ACOs in higher spending
regions have been shown to yield greater savings during
the performance period, perhaps from addressing the
“lowest hanging fruit” of cost savings [15]. Taken to-
gether, our results add to current literature that suggests
a complex relationship between individual organizational
attributes (e.g., degree of integration, geography, ACO
size, patient case-mix) and healthcare spending that will
impact how the structure and composition of ACOs
evolve over time.
Our study has several limitations. First, because the
Shared Savings Program public-use file provides summa-
rized information at the ACO level, our findings are sub-
ject to the ecological fallacy. In other words, although
greater PCP focus was associated with higher spending
when aggregated to the ACO level, this may not be the
Table 1 Characteristics of ACOs with least and greatest PCP
focus











15.5 (3.5) 15.6 (3.6) 0.94
Percentage of minority
beneficiaries
13.8 (13.7) 24.5 (23.5) 0.004
Mean percentage of
ESRD patients
1.01 (0.7) 1.26 (0.8) 0.09
Mean percentage of
disabled patients
15.2 (8.8) 15.7 (6.2) 0.73
Mean percentage of
dual-eligible beneficiaries
6.3 (5.9) 14.1 (18.7) 0.004
Rural (%) 3.6 7.3 0.40
Census Division (%) 0.01
New England 18.2 1.8
Middle Atlantic 20.0 10.9
East North Central 7.3 20.0
West North Central 5.5 9.1
South Atlantic 23.6 23.6
East South Central 5.5 3.6
West South Central 7.3 14.6
Mountain 9.1 1.8
Pacific 3.6 9.1
Puerto Rico 0.0 5.5
ESRD End-stage renal disease
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case for individual physicians or beneficiaries. Nonethe-
less, our methods of evaluation (i.e., ACO-level) are con-
sistent with the approach used by CMS for measuring
quality and determining shared savings or losses in the
MSSP program. Second, because the SSP dataset does
not include beneficiary-level information, we cannot
fully account for differences in patient complexity across
ACOs. However, our multivariable models did adjust for
measurable ACO characteristics that may influence
utilization and spending, including geographic region,
rurality, proportion of non-white patients and those with
dual-eligible status. In addition, our results compare
utilization and savings from the first performance
period, and these findings may shift over time as ACOs
refine their ability to improve quality and reduce costs.
Finally, this study only included MSSP ACOs and there-
fore our results may not be generalizable to other ACOs,
including the Pioneer ACO that have demonstrated
modest savings in their early implementation [3, 16].
Our measurement of PCP focus also has limitations.
First, this utilization-based metric does not capture qual-
ity, care coordination, or other aspects of care delivery
Fig. 2 Mean number of specialists and PCPs in MSSP Accountable Care Organizations according to strata of primary care focus
Table 2 Utilization and spending in ACOs with least and greatest PCP focus
Metric (95% CI) Least PCP focus Greatest PCP focus p-value
Total E&M visits per 1000 person years 9957 (9511–10,403) 10,664 (10,139–11,188) 0.04
E&M visits by a PCP per 1000 person years 3131 (2820–3440) 5561 (5202–5920) <0.001
E&M visits by a specialist per 1000 person years 5065 (4617–5513) 4319 (4044–4595) 0.005
Acute care hospital discharges per 1000 person yearsa 292 (274–311) 328 (309–348) 0.01
30-day acute care readmissions per 1000 dischargesa 146 (141–152) 156 (150–162) 0.02
Post discharge (30 day) provider visits per 1000 dischargesa 757 (748–765) 776 (767–785) 0.01
Skilled nursing facility discharges per 1000 person yearsa 73 (61–85) 106 (93–119) 0.001
Emergency Department visits per 1000 person yearsa 680 (639–722) 756 (711–800) 0.02
Physician/supplier spending per assigned beneficiarya $3296 (3112–3479) $3165 (2970–3360) 0.36
Acute care hospital spending per assigned beneficiarya $2774 (2561–2987) $3180 (2953–3407) 0.02
Skilled nursing facility spending per assigned beneficiarya $818 (642–993) $1199 (1063–1437) 0.002
Savings per beneficiary per year $87 ($-104–$278) $-142 ($-346–$61) 0.13
aAdjusted for number of beneficiaries, percent non-white beneficiaries, percent dual eligible, percent age over 74 years, census division and months in ACO
E&M Evaluation and management
PCP Primary care physician
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that may have important implications for utilization and
spending at the ACO level. Additionally, because we dis-
tinguish between specialist versus primary care oriented
advanced practice providers we elected to not include
these services. Second, the thresholds for our PCP focus
variable were selected to ensure an equal number of
ACOs in each quartile. As such, they do not necessarily
represent clinically meaningful thresholds in the
provision of primary care services. Third, E&M services
provided in patient homes or nursing homes are con-
tained within the PCP metric. These beneficiaries may
be responsible for a larger number of visits and are likely
to be sicker and incur greater healthcare costs, which
may contribute to differences in utilization between
ACOs with the least versus greatest PCP focus. Finally,
our measurement of PCP focus may be a surrogate for
other organizational attributes that influence utilization
and spending within an ACO such as pre-existing rela-
tionships between physicians and/or prior clinical inte-
gration among the organizations forming an ACO or the
available supply of specialists in the area. For example,
ACOs in the two lowest quartiles of PCP focus include a
substantially larger numbers of specialists per 1000
beneficiaries, a measure that may reflect stronger inte-
gration of primary and specialty care. An example of this
is the Billings Clinic in Montanta, where the ACO exists
within an already established, highly integrated delivery
system.
These limitations notwithstanding, our findings have
several implications for stakeholders. For ACO leaders,
our results suggest that having PCPs provide a greater
percentage of the evaluation and management services
may not be a pivotal determinant of whether these orga-
nizations can achieve early cost savings. Futures studies
will need to evaluate for which conditions population-
level utilization and costs may be lower when specialists
play a greater role providing evaluation and management
services (e.g., congestive heart failure patients receiving
care in cardiology clinics) [17]. There are several reasons
why inclusion of a greater number of specialists may aid
in reducing inpatient utilization and costs of care. First,
aligning specialists with ACO priorities will likely in-
crease communication and care coordination and reduce
fragmentation of care. Second, increased engagement of
specialists may place greater financial incentives on the
delivery of high value care, including decreased
utilization and reduced costs of care while maintaining
quality. Inclusion of specialists in ACOs may also im-
prove the breadth of services provided within an ACO,
thereby limiting the need for patients to receive care
outside the reach of the ACO. While this study does not
provide specific answers to this question, the overall
findings motivate a deeper assessment of the relative
cost-efficiency of primary and specialty care in ACOs,
and how this varies across specific conditions and pa-
tient populations. Such information may help to guide
the distribution of PCPs and specialists within ACOs.
For policymakers, these data should encourage more
detailed beneficiary-level analyses with longer follow-up
that may provide greater detail and motivating factors
surrounding our early findings. Understanding the struc-
tural features of an ACO that facilitate appropriate
utilization and lower cost care will become increasingly
important as CMS encourages renewing MSSP ACOs to
move toward the two-sided risk model, while also intro-
ducing the Next Generation ACO program that involves
even greater risk sharing by ACO providers [18].
Conclusions
Moving forward, careful assessment of ACO structure
and longitudinal spending patterns will inform success
within the MSSP. Our findings underscore the import-
ance of gaining a deeper understanding of the complex
ways that organizational, physician, and patient charac-
teristics influence ACO performance. Subsequent ana-
lyses will require datasets that link Medicare claims with
detailed beneficiary, provider and hospital information
for MSSP participants. While our study examines the
policy relevant metrics of utilization and spending, we
do not evaluate the cost effectiveness of the ACO model
and its broader economic impact. Ultimately, such
timely analyses of the comparative performance of MSSP
ACOs will provide essential feedback for payers, physi-
cians and policymakers as these organizations expand in
number and assume increasing financial risk.
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